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Abstract
The basic problem in the cooperation theory is to justify the coopera-
tion. Here we propose a new approach, where players are driven by their
altruism to cooperate or not. The probability of cooperation depends also
on the co-player’s reputation. We find that players with positive altruism
cooperate and met cooperation. In this approach, payoffs are not relevant.
The mechanism is most efficient in the fully connected network.
1 Introduction and the model
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is perhaps the most famous paradox in the game
theory [1]. Each of two identical players has two different strategies: to coop-
erate (C) with the other or to defect (D) the cooperation. The payoff matrix
is constructed as that for each player, the strategy D is always better than the
strategy C. When both defect, their payoff is worse than when both of them
cooperate. The challenge is to understand the reason why people do cooperate
in situations, where PD applies. The spectrum if these situations is very rich:
from the nuclear disarmament to the environmental protection, from a com-
petition between companies to disputes on child rearing. However, to justify
cooperation in the frames of PD seems to be impossible a priori. The minimal
assumption of the classical game theory is that players are rational, i. e. they
do not play strategies where their payoff is always worse. Such strategies are
termed ’dominated’. In PD, the strategy of cooperation is dominated, q.e.d.
Faced with this difficulty, researchers tend to capture PD from more general
point of view, as the evolutionary game theory [2], where boundedly rational
agents learn the best strategy in repeated games. These generalizations met
older discussions within sociology, to what extent the game theory can be ap-
plied in social sciences. Meanwhile the subject of the research changed from a
herd of ”undersocialized” actors, rationally looking for their individual benefits,
towards a society of ”oversocialized” citizens, obeying social norms which they
have been internalized [3, 4]. Collective forms of cooperation entered the dis-
cussion, as the altruistic punishment [5] or indirect reciprocity and reputation
[6]. Lists of references can be found, for example, in [7, 8, 9, 10]. Most if not all
of these references rely on the concept of payoffs.
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Here we intend to formulate a minimal model of cooperation, without pay-
offs, and with reputation as a necessary ingredient. Reputation - commonly
accessible information on the individual scores - secures the collective character
of the system dynamics. Scores are memorized as Wi. Each time when i co-
operates, Wi is transformed as Wi → (Wi + 1)/2; when i defects, Wi → Wi/2.
This is a convenient way to memorize a few recent decisions of i. (Also in this
way we omit the complexity of subtle differences between cooperators with co-
operators and defectors of defectors [6]; we note that such a selectivity leads to
a paradox, when a defector could qualify a defection of his own as the proper
choice and an argument to cooperate.) Another element of our approach is the
level of altruism ǫi of a player, as a measure of her/his willingness to cooperate
with others or to defect. The probability that i cooperates with j is calculated
as
P (i, j) = Wj + ǫi (1)
limited additionally to the range (0,1). Then, if Wj + ǫi > 1, P (i, j) is set to
1. The altruisms ǫi are selected randomly from the uniform distribution in the
range (-1/2,1/2) and they are not changed during the simulation.
Looking for a similar approach in literature, we find that some our assump-
tions are close to those made by Levine [11]. There, a player 1 calculates the
utility of the co-player 2 and the one of himself with different weights. These
weights depend on the altruism of the player 1; also, the obtained utility depends
on the altruism of the co-player 2. With these assumptions, Levine analysed the
data of the ultimatum bargaining and the public good experiments, and he got
a reasonable accordance with these data. The model [11] was supposed to be a
simpler version of some preceding approach [12]. Our approach is even simpler
in the sense that here we have no utility at all. The mutual interaction between
players is parametrized as to reflect merely the influence of a particular decision
on the probabilities of the other’s decisions. In our former works, this shortcut
was found to be quite efficient [13, 14].
2 Results
In Fig. 1 we show the percentages of cases when the player i was rewarded
(R, both cooperated), defected when he cooperated (S), when i defected when
his co-player cooperated (T) and when both defected (U), against the altru-
ism ǫi. These results indicate that the altruism triggers a positive feedback:
an increased probability to cooperate provides a good reputation what induces
the willigness of others to cooperate. As the number of games increases, the
curves become more and more clear and thin; this is due to the fact that initial
transient effects contribute less and less to the whole statistics. It is somewhat
surprising that the same data are much less clear, when presented against the
reputations Wi (Fig.2). This is a consequence of strong fluctuations of W ’s; in
our model, a recent defection turns the reputation into ruins, i.e. to values less
than 0.5.
Trying to omit this difficulty by some kind of a mean field approach we can
ask if there is a unique curve W (ǫ), where 0 < W (ǫ) < 1. Let us suppose that
in stationary state, a player i with infinitesimally small ǫi has equal chance to
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Figure 1: Statistics of four different situations (R, S, T and U) against the
altruism level ǫ. The picture refers to the state after 5 × 106 games played in
the set of 1000 players. For ǫ > 0, the mutual cooperation (R) is most likely.
For ǫ < 0, the mutual defection (U) happens in most cases.
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Figure 2: Statistics of four different situations (R, S, T and U) against the
reputation W . The picture refers to the state after 5 × 106 games played in
the set of 1000 players. Narrow black bands are produced by events, when a
reputation close to 1 is reduced by factor 0.5, (0.5)2 etc.
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Figure 3: Correlation between the reputation W and the altruism ǫ. The con-
ditions of the calculation are the same as in Fig.1. The number of players with
W and ǫ within given ranges is shown in the vertical axis.
cooperate and to defect, and then his reputation does not change in the average.
The probability that he cooperates is then equal to 1/2. For a given curveW (ǫ),
this probability can be found as
Pi(Cooperate) =
∫
1/2
−1/2
dǫj [W (ǫj) + ǫi] =< W > +ǫi (2)
where < W > is the mean value of W . This equation has no solution, as <
W >= const(ǫi). On the other hand, we can expect that W (−ǫ) = 1/2−W (ǫ),
and therefore < W >=1/2. The equation above can be fulfilled only for the
altruism ǫi=0. Now let us consider the case when the function W (ǫ) = 0 for
ǫ < 0, otherwise W (ǫ) = 1. Asking, if this function is stationary, consider a
player with ǫ < 0. He cooperates with probability 0 with those of W = 0 and
with probability 1 + ǫ < 1 with those of W = 1. Then his mean probability
of cooperation is (0 + 1 + ǫ)/2 <, what is less than 0.5. Therefore his rep-
utation decreases; however, according to the actual curve W (ǫ), it is already
zero and cannot decrease any more. Now let us consider a player with ǫ > 0.
He cooperates with those of W = 0 with probability ǫ > 0, and with those
of W = 1 cooperates for sure. In the average, he cooperates with probability
(1 + ǫ)/2, what is larger than 0.5. His reputation could increase, but according
to the curve W (ǫ) it is already equal to 1. This is a proof that indeed the curve
W (ǫ) is stationary. This result is consistent with the numerical results shown
in Fig. 3, where the correlation between the reputation W (ǫ) and the altruism
ǫ is shown.
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Figure 4: Statistics of four different situations (R, S, T and U) against the
altruism level ǫ. The picture refers to the state after 5 × 105 games played in
the set of 1000 players. On the contrary to Fig. 1, only ten percent of links are
present in the network. The games are played only along the links.
It is of interest to check also the role of the structure of the connections
between players. In our model, best results are obtained if each player mets
with each; this is the case of a fully connected graph. For the classical Erdo¨s-
Renyi network of 1000 players, the effect is somewhat disrupted for the mean
degree < k >=100 (Fig.4). This suggests that the mechanism is most effective
when players have an access to the whole spectrum of co-players.
3 Discussion
Our results indicate that the cooperation can be established in the presence of
two model ingredients. First is the altruism, understood as an enhanced atti-
tude to cooperate. The enhancement means that this attitude excesses a purely
rational evaluation of the probability that a co-player cooperates. The second
ingredient is the reputation, what means that the information is scored about
individual players. In this construction, the information on payoffs is omitted,
what can mean that either i) the players are not conscious about any payoff
and they do not take it into account, or ii) the payoffs are known and motivate
players to cooperate or not. In both cases, our results remain valid.
Simple as it is, our model is not universal in its particular details. The
method of calculating the probabilities of cooperation and defection assures
them to be zero or one for some values of the parameters W and ǫ. This means
that some players always cooperate with each other, and some others always
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defect each other. A question appears, if our mechanism is resistent with re-
spect to some lack of information, when the reputation is unknown. Having this
question in mind, we started the simulatuion from the case where the reputa-
tion W = 0.5 for all players. As described above, we have observed that the
cooperation between some players appears. After some time, the cooperation
is established within a group of players, more firmly between those with larger
level ǫ of altruism. We can conclude that although the reputation of this or
the other player is reduced by a clash with a notorious defector, the mechanism
persists in the group as a whole. This should be true even if the method of
calculating the probabilities P (i, j) is quantitatively different.
Finally, our results suggest that the positive feedback between the reputa-
tion and the altruism is particularly sensible to the contact between players with
possibly large levels of altruism. This is the necessary condition of an increase
of their reputations, what in turn enhances the probability of their cooperation
and so on. In our model, each pair of connected players interacts with equal
probability. Then, any dilution of the (social) network which disregards their
cooperation, as this presented in Fig. 4, makes the feedback less efficient. How-
ever, in real social networks contact is maintained mostly between players who
cooperate. As it was formulated by Mark Granovetter ”the strength of a tie is
a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity,
the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize
the tie.” [15]. For Granovetter, it was natural to consider rather positive than
negative social links (see the footnote in [15] to the above citation). Then, the
departure from the fully connected network to a more realistic social structure
should be done by an elimination of bonds between those who are not willing
to cooperate. Provided that cooperators are available, isolation of defectors is
less costful than punishment. If the social structure is taken into account in this
proper way, our feedback is expected to be more strong than it can be deduced
from our numerical results.
A comment should be added on the relation between the model described
here and theories of cooperation, known in literature: kin or group selection,
direct and indirect reciprocity [6]. Our point of view is that some overlaps ex-
ist between our feedback mechanism and at least some of these theories. The
concept of indirect reciprocity seems to be most close, because in our model the
reputation is an attribute of an individual player, and the information about it
is commonly accessible. On the other hand, our feedback seems a convenient
starting point to a group formation process. Similar approach to the Heider
balance problem was summarized in [16]. Finally, the kin selection theory could
be also addressed within our model by an enhancement of initial values of rep-
utations within the same family or tribe. Among these possibilities, the group
formation seems most attractive for further research.
Acknowledgements. The research is partially supported within the FP7
project SOCIONICAL, No. 231288.
6
References
[1] A. Rapoport and A. M. Chammah, Prisoner’s Dilemma, University of
Michigan Press, 1965.
[2] R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York 1984.
[3] M. Granovetter, Economic action and social structure: the problem of em-
beddedness, Amer. J. of Sociology, 91 (1985) 481-510.
[4] W. Raub and J. Weesie, Reputation and efficiency in social interactions:
an example of network effects, Amer. J. of Sociology, 96 (1990) 626-654.
[5] E. Fehr and S. Ga¨chter, Altruistic punishment in humans, Nature 415, 10
January 2002, 137-140.
[6] M. A. Nowak and K. Sigmund, Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image
scoring, Nature 393 (1998) 573-577.
[7] R. Axelrod, On six advances on cooperation theory, Analyse und Kritik 22
(2000) 130-151.
[8] G. Szabo´ and G. Fa´th, Evolutionary games on graphs, Phys. Rep. 446
(2007) 97-216.
[9] H. Brandt, H. Ohtsuki, Y. Iwasa and K. Sigmund, A survey on indirect
reciprocity, in Mathematics for Ecology and Evolution, Eds. Y. Takeuchi,
Y. Iwasa and K. Sato, Springer, Berlin 2007, pp. 21-50.
[10] E. Fehr and U. Fischbacher, Human altruism - proximate patterns and
evolutionary origins, Analyse und Kritik 27 (2005) 6-47.
[11] D. K. Levine, Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments, Rev. of
Economic Dynamics, 1 (1998) 593-622.
[12] M. Rabin, Endogenous preferences in games, Amer. Econom. Rev. 83
(1993) 1281-1302.
[13] K. Ku lakowski, Cops or robbers - a bistable society, Int. J. Mod. Phys. C
19 (2008) 1105-1111.
[14] K. Ku lakowski, The norm game: punishing enemies and not friends, J.
Economic Interaction and Coordination (2009), in print.
[15] M. Granovetter, The strength of weak ties, Amer. J. of Sociology, 78 (1973)
1360-1380.
[16] K. Ku lakowski, Some recent attempts to simulate the Heider balance prob-
lem, Computing in Science and Engineering, July/August 2007, 86-91.
7
